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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Unfair Labor Practices—Board Jurisdiction When an Arbi-
tration Clause is Used.—NLRB v. Huttig Sash C.4 Door Co.'—Huttig
Sash & Door Company Incorporated (Huttig) and the Carpenters District
Council of St. Louis & Vicinity (Union) entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement which was to be effective for four years. The contract provided
that it was not to be changed or modified except upon compliance with the
notice requirements of the National Labor Relations Act. 2
 Employees were
classified according to the types of jobs they performed, minimum hourly
wage rates were established for each job classification, and regular increases
for minimum rates and rates above the minimum were specified. The employer
was permitted to transfer an employee to a higher or lower classification,
but only if the pre-transfer wage rate was continued for a specified period.
The grievance procedure, established to settle disputes concerning contract
interpretation, required both parties to give an "earnest effort" to settle-
ment and to submit the dispute to arbitration if the procedure failed?
On November 19, 1964, Huttig notified the Union that on November
30, the above-minimum wage rates of eleven employees would be reduced to
conform to their present job classifications. In answer to a protest by the
Union, the company claimed that such reductions were permitted by the
contract, and on November 30, the employees were notified of the wage
reduction. Except for these reductions, there were no significant changes in
the employees' jobs nor were their classifications changed. Neither party
invoked the grievance-arbitration procedure.
The Union filed unfair-labor-practice charges with the National Labor
Relations Board. It charged that Huttig had unilaterally reduced wages
without giving the Union the opportunity to bargain and had modified the
terms of the contract without complying with the notice requirements and
thus had committed the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain collec-
tively, a violation of Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.' In answer to these charges, Huttig once again claimed that the
wage reductions were permitted by the contract and, therefore, their imple-
mentation could not constitute an unfair labor practice. Huttig also argued
that even if the reductions were a breach of the contract, the Board had no
jurisdiction to hear the Union's charges because the determination of whether
such wage reductions constituted a breach and an unfair labor practice
required an interpretation of a contract containing a provision for arbitra-
tion of grievences. The Board found that it had jurisdiction and that the
company had committed the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain
with the Union. It ordered Huttig to cease and desist from the unfair labor
practice and to bargain with the Union if the Union so requested. 3
377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967), aff'g 154 N.L.R.B. 811 (1965).
2 Under Section 8(d) of the Act, a party to the contract can modify or terminate
the contract only if it serves written notice to the other party sixty days prior to the
termination or modification, offers to meet and negotiate with the other party, notifies
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and any state or territorial agency and
continues the contract in full force for the sixty day period. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
3 377 F.2d at 966.
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1964).
5 Huttig Sash & Door Co., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 811, 812, 817-18 (1965).
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On the Board's petition, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
enforced the order. HELD • The Board is not deprived of its unfair-labor-
practice jurisdiction by reason of the fact that the determination of whether
an unfair labor practice has been committed requires the interpretation of
a contract which contains an arbitration clause.
In reaching this decision the court was faced with two issues. The first
was whether the Board had jurisdiction to find an unfair labor practice
where this finding required an interpretation of the contract; the second,
whether the Board had jurisdiction to make this interpretation where the
contract contained an arbitration clause. To resolve these two issues the
court relied upon two recent Supreme Court cases. The court considered
NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp" to be conclusive on the first issue and
NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co.,' with its emphasis upon the nature of the rela-
tionship that exists between the Board and arbitration and upon Section
10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 to be determinative of the second
issue. The court, in resolving the second issue, also placed emphasis upon
the policies behind Acme and C & C, especially the policy that delay either
in the courts or in arbitration should be avoided in the settlement of labor
disputes °
In C & C, the collective-bargaining contract, which provided for a
grievance procedure but not for arbitration, established job classifications,
a wage rate for each of these classifications and reserved to the employer the
right to pay, as a reward to an employee, a wage higher than the one desig-
nated for his classification. The employer, without notice to the union,
offered the same increased wage to all the employees of particular work
crews even though the wages of the employees varied under the contract.
When the union learned of the plan, it protested that the increase was a
violation of the contract. Although the employer was willing to discuss the
increase with the union, it would not under any circumstances delay enact-
ment of its plan. The union filed charges, and the employer was found to
have committed the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain by unilat-
erally changing wages in a manner not permitted by the contract. 1° The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce, holding that the
Board had no jurisdiction to find an unfair labor practice when such a find-
ing required an interpretation of a contract.fi In reversing the court of
appeals and upholding the Board's order, the Supreme Court held that the
Board had jurisdiction to interpret the contract insofar as this was necessary
to determine the unfair-labor-practice charge but could not determine the
contractual rights of the parties. 12
e 385 U.S. 421 (1967), rev'g 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965), aff'g 148 N.L.R.B. 414
(1964), noted in 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 997 (1967).
7 385 U.S. 432 (1967), rev'g 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir.), aff'g 150 N.L.R.B. 1463
(1965). See Comment, 1966-67 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 8 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 771, 826-29 (1967).
8 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
9 377 F.2d at 969-70.
10 C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964).
11 NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965).
12 385 U.S. at 428.
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There are, of course, many similarities between Huttig and C & C:
unilateral wage changes, no bargaining by the parties, and the failure to
invoke the contractual grievance procedure. Most important is the fact
that in each case the employer defended on the ground that the wage
changes were permitted by the contract and thus required the Board to
interpret the contract to find the unfair labor practice. The cases are dis-
tinguishable, however, because the contract in C & C contained no arbitra-
tion clause, and this distinction presents the second issue: whether the Board
had jurisdiction to make this contract interpretation where the contract con-
tained an arbitration clause.
The court regarded Acme as controlling on this issue. In Acme, the em-
ployer agreed that when equipment was transferred to another location,
the employees who worked with the machinery could transfer with it if
conditions permitted. After some equipment was moved, the union requested
information regarding the transfer. The employer refused to supply the
information claiming that there was no contract violation. The contract
provided for a grievance procedure culminating in compulsory arbitration.
While the grievances which the union had filed were still pending, the union
filed unfair-labor-practice charges for the employer's refusal to supply infor-
mation. The Board found that the information was necessary for the union's
determination of whether it should continue to process the grievance, and
that, therefore, the employer's failure to supply the information was a refusal
to bargain 1 3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to enforce
the Board's order, finding that for the Board to determine whether the in-
formation was relevant, it had had to interpret a contract which contained
an arbitration clause and had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court reversed and ordered enforcement of the Board's order,
stating that the Board had not made a binding construction of the contract
but had simply determined the relevancy of the requested information and
thus had acted within its jurisdiction. 15 The Supreme Court was careful to
point out that the interpretation in Acme, unlike the one in C & C, had no
bearing on the merits of the dispute, namely, whether the employer had
violated the contract,' 6 and that for this reason the decision was not an
infringement on the power of the arbitrator later to make a binding inter-
pretation.'' Huttig and Acme are distinguishable because the contract inter-
pretation in Huttig determined the merits of the dispute, i.e., whether Huttig
violated the contract when it reduced the wages, while the interpretation in
Acme was an aid to the arbitral process and did not affect the power of the
arbitrator to make a binding interpretation of the contract.
It has been shown that C & C enabled the Huttig court to determine
that the Board could make a contract interpretation in the course of de-
ciding an unfair-labor-practice case. Acme established that the Board could
do this even if there were an arbitration clause in the agreement as long as
13 Acme Indus. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1965).
14 Acme Indus. Co. v. NLRB, 351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965).
16 385 U.S. at 437.
16 Id. at 438 n.7.
17 Id. at 438.
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the contract interpretation did not decide the merits of the dispute. Huttig,
however, involved both an arbitration clause and an interpretation which
decided the merits of the dispute. The court, therefore, was faced with the
as yet undecided issue whether such a contract interpretation in the presence
of an arbitration clause divested the Board of its jurisdiction. The court
held that the language of the National Labor Relations Act, the relationship
between the Board and arbitration, and the policies behind C & C and
Acme established that the Board can make such an interpretation in the
presence of an arbitration clause.
The language of the National Labor Relations Act resolves this issue.
The Board derives its jurisdiction over unfair labor practices from Section
10(a) of the Act: "The Board is empowered ... to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce. This power
shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise." 18 Literally
interpreted, this section states that the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices is not divested by any other method of settlement no matter how
established; this would include a method established by contract, such as
arbitration. But Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act
states that it is the method of settlement established by contract which
should be used to resolve disputes: "Final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement." 19 This policy of section 203(d)
was enunciated in a group of three Supreme Court cases, the Steelworkers'
Trilogy,20 which involved two suits to compel arbitration and one for
enforcement of an arbitral award. These cases stated that this policy could
be effectuated only H the disputes arising from the collective-bargaining agree-
ment were settled by the method agreed upon by the parties 21 Thus, it seems
that in a dispute where the contract contains an arbitration clause, the
Board is given jurisdiction by section 10(a) but is instructed not to exercise
it by the policy of section 203(d) as enforced by the Steelworkers' Trilogy.
In Acme, however, the Supreme Court stated that the Steelworkers' Trilogy
does not affect the Board's jurisdiction. This is so because those cases dealt
with the relationship between the courts and arbitration22 and thus bear
little relevance to the different relationship between the Board and arbitra-
tion. The Board's relationship to arbitration differs because a contract, by
specifying which subjects are to be submitted to arbitration, limits the
arbitrator's power and a court's determination of what constitutes an
arbitrable dispute. But the subjects over which the Board has power are
determined by statute and never by a contract. Though in some cases the
18 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
12 Id. § 173(d).
20 United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
21- 363 U.S. at 566; 363 U.S. at 583; 363 U.S. at 599.
22 385 U.S. at 436.
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Board has refused to exercise its jurisdiction because the particular circum-
stances of a case were such that the policies and purposes of the Act would
be best served by settlement in the grievance-arbitration procedure, 23 it has
never held that the mere presence of an arbitration provision in a contract
deprived it of its unfair-labor-practice jurisdiction. 24
 This universal practice
of the Board coupled with the explicit statements of the Supreme Court in
Acme would indicate that section 203(d) in no way affects the Board's
unfair-labor-practice jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court did in Acme,25 section 10(a) may be viewed in
conjunction with other sections of the National Labor Relations Act to
determine whether a particular dispute is within the Board's jurisdiction.
Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) make a refusal to bargain collectively with the
union an unfair labor practice," and section 8(d) defines collective bargain-
ing as "the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times to confer in good faith with respect
to ... the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder
. . . . "27 A question arising under a contract would certainly include a
question concerning the contract's interpretation. As shown previously,
section 10(a) preserves the Board's jurisdiction to decide unfair-labor-prac-
tice disputes despite the presence of an arbitration clause in the contract.
From all these sections it can be concluded that, regardless of whether there
is an arbitration clause, the Board has the power to find a refusal to fulfill
the obligation to bargain in good faith with respect to a question arising under
the contract, namely, how the contract ought to be interpreted. These sections
establish that the Board did have jurisdiction in Iluttig.
The policy of avoiding delay in the settlement of labor disputes also
points toward Board jurisdiction in this case. Because one of the basic
purposes of the labor laws is the orderly and speedy settlement of labor dis-
putes, any delay in obtaining solutions for these disputes is in some measure
adverse to the policies underlying these laws. In C & C, the Supreme Court
expressed concern about the fact that if the Board did not have jurisdiction
of the case the union would be faced with the long delay of securing judicial
relief." The avoidance of delay was also a major factor in Acme. The Court
there noted that if the Board did not have jurisdiction the union would have
to proceed to arbitration to obtain the information needed to determine
whether its claims were sufficiently meritorious to be processed further in
the grievance procedure." Huttig is similar, for if the Board had been held
not to have jurisdiction, the dispute procedure would have begun again. The
parties would then have suffered a loss of time and money like the parties in
C & C and Acme.
Despite section 203(d), Section 10(a) of the Act establishes the Board's
23 E.g., Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 1651 (1962); Spielberg Mfg. Co.,
112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
24 Electric Motors & Specialties, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 131, 136 (1964).
25 385 U.S. at 436-37.
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (5) (1964).
27 Id. § 158(d).
28 385 U.S. at 429-30.
29 Id. at 438.
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jurisdiction even though there is an arbitration clause in the contract, and
section 10(a) in conjunction with other sections shows that the Board may
find an unfair labor practice which requires an interpretation of the contract.
Moreover, a decision that the Board did not have jurisdiction in this case
would be adverse to the policy of avoiding delay. These were sufficient
reasons for the court to hold that the Board had jurisdiction to find an unfair
labor practice in Huttig.
THOMAS HOWARD BROWN
Principal and Surety—Miller Act—Duty to Apply Payments to a Se-
cured Debt.—United States ex rd. Hyland Elec. Supply Co. v. Franchi
Bros. Constr. Corp.'—Franchi Brothers Construction Corporation (Franchi)
contracted with the United States to build an ammunition-storage facility
at the Ethan Allen Air Force Base in Vermont. As required by the
Miller Act,2 Franchi furnished a payment bond under which Franchi would
be liable for any nonpayment to persons supplying labor and materials for
use on the government job. Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland) was
surety on this bond. Fairway Electrical Contractors Incorporated (Fairway)
subcontracted with Franchi to do the electrical work on the storage facility.
Hyland Electrical Supply Company (Hyland) supplied Fairway with all
the necessary electrical material which had a total value of $18,647.38.
Hyland had previously supplied materials to Fairway for use on other
jobs and still had accounts receivable for their payment.
Both Fairway and Hyland requested Franchi to make any progress
payments from the government job in the form of checks payable to Fair-
way and Hyland as joint payees. Franchi complied with this request and
sent several checks, which had a total value of $19,597, to Fairway, who
forwarded them to Hyland for endorsement. Hyland endorsed the checks
and returned them to Fairway. Fairway thereafter sent several payments
to Hyland—in total $16,597—and instructed Hyland to credit only $9,000
to the account for materials supplied on the government job, directing that
the remaining amount ($7,597) be applied to its other unsecured debts
owed to Hyland. After each application of the payments, Hyland notified
Franchi of the amount with which the Franchi-Fairway account was credited;
Franchi made no reply. There was still a balance of $9,647.38 on the secured
Franchi-Fairway account when Fairway became insolvent and filed a peti-
tion in bankruptcy. Hyland instituted suit in the United States District
Court, seeking to recover the $9,647.38 against Franchi and the surety,
Maryland. The district court entered judgment for Hyland against both
Franchi and Maryland in the amount sought by Hyland. 3 The court reasoned
that Franchi, because of its knowledge of Hyland's allocation of the funds,
was estopped from asserting that Hyland had an equitable obligation to
1 378 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d (1964).
3 United States ex rel. Hyland Elec Supply Co. v. Franchi Bros. Constr. Corp., Civil
No. 4061 (D. Vt., filed May 5, 1966).
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